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Abstract 
As part of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's Space Shuttle Transportation 
System, the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System 
has played a vital role in the success of 60 space 
missions. This paper concludes that the robustness 
and success of the Canadarm over its 20 year life 
can be attributed to the adaptations that have been 
made to it to meet the increased demands that have 
been placed on the system. Enhancements that have 
been made to the arm to improve its operational 
capabilities, reduce risk and extend its li fe are 
examined in this paper. Potential future 
enhancements based on operational trends are also 
discussed. 
1 Introduction 
The Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS, 
a.k.a the Canadarm) flew its inaugural flight 
on board the Space Shuttle Columbia (STS-2) in 
November of 1981. The four arms that are in 
service today as part of NASA's Space Shuttle fleet 
have enjoyed 20 years of successfu l use over 60 
missions. While sharing common mechanical 
elements with its original design, the system is 
sign ificantly different than it was 20 years ago. 
Mission success over the operational life of the arm 
has been achieved by making constant adaptations 
to the Canadarm based on experience of the 
hardware performance in the env ironment of space 
and addressing new operational requirements. Since 
1981 the arms have undergone numerous hardware 
changes, improvements in manufacturing processes 
and over 39 changes to the control software. 
In making adaptations to the arm, three key items 
have been, and continue to be, addressed : 
1.) Expanding the system's capabilities. 
2.) Reducing risk through improvements in safety. 
3.) Improving the arm's abi lity to meet the flight 
manifest (Supportability). 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the 
SRMS has been improved to address lessons 
learned from the prolonged use of robotics in space. 
This paper will also discuss trends in the 
operational use of the arm and how they relate to 
past, current and future upgrade activities. 
2 Canadarm Adaptations to Expand 
Operational Capability 
2.1 Original Operational Requirements: 
Payload Deployment and Retrieval 
The original arm was designed primarily for the 
deployment and retrieval of payloads and is part of 
the Shuttle' s Payload Deployment and Retrieval 
System (PDRS). It was designed to capture "free-
flying" payloads fitted with a grapp le fixture and 
manoeuvre them for both berthing (in the cargo 
bay) and deploying. The arm was originally 
designed to manoeuvre with unloaded tip speeds of 
2 ftlsec and 2 deglsec yet be able to precisely 
control payloads up to 65 ,000 Ibm. 
2.2 Operational Evolution of Canadarm: 
Common Uses 
Although originally designed for payload 
deployment and retrieval , over the years the SRMS 
has proven very useful for a wide variety of other 
tasks, which have become crucial for mission 
success. In addition to deployment and retrieval of 
payloads current use of the arm regularly includes 
such vital tasks as: 
a) Assembling Space Stations; The arm was used 
to help install a docking module on the Russian 
MIR space station in November of 1995. The 
arm has become essential in the assembly of 
the International Space Station (ISS) having 
assembled over 85 tons of ISS hardware. 
b) Workhorse for Spacewalks; Using different 
types of foot restraints attached to the end of 
the arm, the arm has provided a mobile and 
stable work platform for Extra Vehicular 
Activities (EVA). This allows the 
spacewalking astronauts to accomplish a 
greater variety of tasks in a shorter period time. 
In conjunction with the BV A crew, relatively 
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large payloads can be moved about the cargo 
bay during for repair and assembly operations. 
c) Flying "eye-in-the-sky" for visual inspection of 
the Orbiter and payloads: The cameras on the 
arm (an elbow camera with a pan and tilt unit 
and a tip camera mounted on the wrist roll 
joint) have been instrumental In 
troubleshooting many on orbit anomalies. 
The arm and its cameras are commonly used to 
observe the functions of other Orbiter 
subsystems and troubleshoot Orbiter thermal 
protection system deterioration. The arm has 
also been used to view cargo bay debris from 
launch , jammed EVA hatch doors and view ice 
that has frozen to the Orbiter. 
d) Lighting mounted on the end of the arm is also 
used to provide extra illumination which has 
aided crew viewing during spacewalks. 
e) Use for Public Relations activities : In addition 
to providing vital video cues to the crew for 
performing operational tasks, cameras on the 
arm and mounted in payloads attached to the 
arm (such as IMAX cameras) have been used 
to bring the experience of space to the general 
public. 
f) Experimental platform for Materials: To study 
the effect of micrometeorite debris on various 
materials the arm has been fitted numerous 
times with a witness plate near the wrist joint. 
2.3 Operational Evolution of Canadarm: 
Unique Tasks 
In addition to the now common tasks, the arm has 
also been used for a variety of unique tasks. 
Examples of these include: 
a) " Fly-swatter / lacrosse stick" to activate a 
satellite's separation switch; After the Syncom 
failure on STS-5 I D, a "flyswatter/ lacrosse 
stick" (fashioned from the binder of an 
operations checklist) was attached to the end of 
the arm and used to activate Syncom' s 
separation switch. 
b) Ice-pick to knock ice off the Orbiter to prevent 
damage during re-entry of the shuttle (on STS-
4lD). 
c) Use of the arm ' s end effector as a sunshade for 
astronomy observations (STS-85; Southwest 
Ultraviolet Imaging System). 
d) "Pushing" on jammed antenna: The arm was 
used to assist stowing of the stuck SIR-B 
antenna on STS-41 G. 
e) Experimental platform for Orbiter plume 
characterisation tests. (SPIFEX). 
f) Contingency operations in support of payload 
materials experiments; The Wake Shield 
Facility (WSF) experimental platform was 
designed to generate an ultra-vacuum 
environment to support Molecular Beam 
Epitaxy (MBE) growth of semi-conductor 
films . On its inaugural flight an anomaly with 
Wakeshield's attitude control systems occurred 
that prevented its release. The arm was used to 
hold WSF away from the Orbiter cargo bay to 
avoid debris and allow completion of mission 
objectives. 
2.4 Canadarm Operational Trends 
As the importance and versatility of the Can ad arm 
became more evident over the I ife of the Orbiter an 
increased engineering emphasis on expanding ~nd 
improving existing capabilities emerged. New 
operational requirements driven in large part by ISS 
assembly tasks requires the arm to perform more 
challenging tasks that had not been envisioned 
when it was originally designed. ISS assembly 
tasks involve connecting large mass payloads with 
a variety of interface attachment systems. The 
interfaces between ISS elements are designed by a 
diverse assortment of subcontractors (including 
several international partners) and are significantly 
different than the those used in the shuttle's cargo 
bay which were designed for regular payload 
deployment and retrieval. 
As a result of past and planned ISS assembly tasks 
there has been an explicit focus on the following 
capabilities and features of the arm: 
a) Ability to manoeuvre larger mass payloads 
with large centre of mass offsets 
(including a fully assembled Space 
Station), 
b) Accurate trajectory control , 
c) Precise (finer) control at low rates, 
d) Positioning accuracy, 
e) Force capabilities, 
f) Ability to backdrive arm, 
g) Displaying more data to the operator, 
h) More flexibility in command and display 
capabilities 
2.5 Expanding Canadarm System Capabilities 
While some of the Canadarm tasks have been 
within the inherent capabilities of the original 
design, many new tasks have been accomplished 
through modifications to the arm. The following is 
a list of adaptations made to the arm to address 
operational trends (discussed in 2.4) that have 
either provided new functionality that did not 
originally exist or improved existing capabilities 
that now routinely allow these new tasks to be 
performed. 
2.5.1 Joint Controller Upgrades 
One of the biggest challenges of the original 
Canadarm servo design was the requirement to 
manoeuvre a wide range of payload masses over a 
considerable range of rates. The ability to quickly 
move the tip of an unloaded arm at 2 ftlsec and 2 
deg/sec and yet still be able to manoeuvre a 65 ,000 
Ibm payload was accomplished in the original 
design using only one set of servo control 
parameters in the joint' s analog Servo Power 
Amplifiers (SPAs). To meet the new requirement to 
manoeuvre a fully assembled Space Station (up to 
586,000 Ibm), a redesign of the arm's SPAs was 
undertaken. A digital SPA design was developed 
that would allow the arm operator to select (via 
software) different sets of servo parameters 
depending on whether the payload was above or 
below 65,000 Ibm. In addition to allowing the arm 
to manoeuvre Space Station sized payloads, the 
digital SPAs were also designed to provide the arm 
with more accurate trajectory control and provide 
more precise control at low rates. 
The accuracy of the arm ' s trajectory relative to the 
operator commands is governed by the ability of 
the six joints to quickly accelerate and accurately 
match corresponding individual joint rate 
commands issued by the arm control systems. Any 
small differences in the co-ordination, sequencing 
and response between the individual joint rates 
leads to errors in the operator desired trajectory. To 
improve arm trajectory accuracy two methods of 
correction have been employed. One that corrects 
for joint rate errors at the servo (the source of the 
error) and the another which superimposes 
corrections to the operators commands based on the 
overall system response. Ensuring accurate joint 
rate performance at the servo level was addressed 
by the digital SPA redesign while corrections made 
at the systems level were addressed by the addition 
of Position Orientation Hold Select (POHS) 
software changes discussed in 2.5 .2. 
An inherent characteristic of the original analog 
servo system was that at low motor currents (which 
corresponded with low joint and tip rates) a non-
linearity existed in the output of the Motor Drive 
Amplifier (MDA) in the SPA (see Figure I) . This 
resulted in less precise control of payloads at very 
low rates which is a particular concern when 
manoeuvring large mass payloads such as the ISS. 
With the design of the digital SPA this non-
linearity has been eliminated resulting in consistent 
servo performance throughout the operational range 
of the MDA. 
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Figure I Analog SPA MDA Performance [I] 
The digital SPA design also incorporated a new 
feed forward function that resulted in a significant 
improvement in rate tracking across the entire range 
of joint rates. The improvements in trajectory 
control that were realised with the digital SPA are 
illustrated in simulation shown in Figure 2. With a 
180K payload significant deviation from the 
desired trajectory would be seen by the operator 
without POHS. With the close tolerance interfaces 
that are involved with Space Station assembly these 
type of deviations would be unacceptable. 
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Figure 2 SPA Trajectory Tracking Performance [I] 
2.5.2 Control Software Modifications 
While improvements in trajectory accuracy were 
addressed in the re-design of the servos, significant 
additional improvement to arm trajectory tracking 
has also been realised through the introduction of a 
Position Orientation Hold Select (POHS) . POHS is 
a new control software feature that superimposes 
corrections to the operator commands based on the 
overall system response. POHS compensates for 
any Can ad arm trajectory errors (uncommanded 
motion) by altering the operator commands 
intrnally within control software. Figure 3 
illustrates an example of trajectory improvements 
that were realized as a result of the incorporation of 
POHS. 
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Greater flexibility was introduced to the display and 
control capabilities of the Canadarm. New features 
were added that would allow the arm operator to 
display arm positioning data relative to any user 
defined referenced frame. Additionally, new 
methods of command (referred to as "Fly-to/Fly-
from") were added which allowed the operator to 
choose which command reference frame they 
preferred . These features were added, in large part, 
to address the preferences of arm operators. Many 
of the Canadarm operators come from the Airforce 
or have backgrounds as pilots and, as such, this new 
feature made manoeuvring payloads with the arm 
more intuitive. Based on a camera view fixed to the 
Orbiter or the payload attached to the arm during 
berthing operations, the operators can now select 
their desired command frame as though their 
reference frame were at this interface. 
Numerous soft3ware modifications have also been 
made over the life of the arms to display additional 
operational data and arm status information on the 
Orbiter's General Purpose Computer (GPC) SPEC 
displays. The software was also changed to allow 
overrides and switch re-assignments to provide 
workarounds for various failure scenarios. 
2.5.3 End Effector redesign 
A major redesign of the arm's end effector was 
implemented to upgrade its capabilities. To 
improve the payload-to- end effector interface 
stiffness the rigidi zation load with which the arm 
"pulls" on the grapple fixture was increased from 
740 Ibr (min) 1800 Ibr (nom) to 900 Ibr 1 1100 Ibr 
(nom) . This significantly increased the loads 
required to generate any interface separation and 
enabled the arm to manoeuvre higher mass 
payloads. 
2.5.4 Operational Techniques 
Knowledge of System 
Based on 
In addition to addressing new operational 
challenges with hardware upgrades as previously 
discussed, engineers have developed operational 
techniques to expand system capabilities based on 
20 years of flight experience and characterisation of 
actual system performance. As the complexity of 
the tasks that the arm was required to perform 
increased with the ISS assembly operations there 
has been a significant focus on the positioning 
accuracy capabilities of the arm. While many of the 
tasks requiring fine alignment of the arm ' s payload 
have been accomplished with the aid of a visual cue 
system (most notably the Space Vision System) 
there has been an increased reliance on the 
accuracy of arm's display of position an attitude 
data as complementary information. Arm position 
and attitude information is computed from encoders 
on each of the six joints (precision of 0.0055 deg). 
The specified accuracy of the arm position and 
orientation at the End Effector is ±2 inches (3-
sigma) and ± I .degree (3-sigma) respectively, 
relative to the Orbiter reference frame whose origin 
is at the base of the arm. Th is accuracy 
specification by itself it is not particularly useful 
when assessing the accuracy of predicted payload 
positions (fixed with respect to the Orbiter) for 
operations planning. All sources of potential error 
(in addition to any arm errors) must be considered 
when assessing the pre-flight predicted position and 
orientation accuracy. As part of an effort to 
understand past performance, translational and 
rotational errors were calculated for 91 fixed 
payload grappled configurations up to STS-97 
(using predicted vs actual arm configuration; 87 in 
Orbiter cargo bay, 4 on ISS). This method takes 
into account all sources of potential error. Table 1 
contains a summary of this overall positioning error 
data. 
Orbiter Ref. Max Error M ••• (00091) 1 Sigma 
X - i.3 in (LDEF) -0.1 in +1- 0.5 in 
V 2.7 in (Z I-ISS) -0.2 in +1-0.7 in 
Z -1.6 in (SPARTAN 207) -0.2 in +1-0.6 in 
RSS 2.8 in (Z I-I55) 1.0 in +1- 0.5 in 
p 
-0.7 deg (CRIST A- -0.1 deg +1- 0.2 deg 
SPAS) 
V -0.8 deg (SPARTAN- 0.0 deg +1- 0.2 deg 
20 1) 
R -0.7 deg (WSF-2) 0.0 deg +1- 0.3 deg 
Total Angle 0.9 deg (SPARTAN 0.4 dog +1- 0.2 deg 
SIC) 
Table I SRMS Predicted vs Actual Positioning Errors [I 1 
As can be seen in Table I the mean translational 
and rotational errors are well within the +1-2" and 
+/- 1 deg arm accuracy specification. However, 
since these values include all sources of error (not 
----- - -_.--
just the arm) the actual arm accuracy is likely much 
better than this. It has been found that in general the 
predicted versus actual position errors during ISS 
assembly are greater than those of payloads in the 
cargo bay. This can be attributed to the greater 
number of interfaces and potential sources of error 
that are associated with ISS assembly operations. 
As such, caution is exercised when referencing 
encoder based position data for ISS operations. 
However, the encoder based attitude data has been 
found to be an acceptable operator reference cue for 
ISS assembly. 
To improve on the use of arm encoder based 
position data to augment other visual cue systems 
during ISS assembly operations a on-orbit 
calibration technique was developed. By using the 
predicted vs actual errors from an ISS fixed 
payload grapple performed prior to attaching an ISS 
element a re-calibrated predicted position can be 
determined and used as a reference. This technique 
was used successfully on STS- I02 to help relocate 
Pressurised Mating Adapter 3 on the Unity Node. 
Although the Canadarm was designed as a rate 
controlled system its ability to exert force has 
become a more common requirement for assembly 
tasks. The ability of the arm to exert a force poses 
unique challenges for the arm. When the operator 
issues a rate command to manoeuvre the arm (or 
attached payload) along a particular trajectory 
corresponding joint rate commands are issued to the 
servos to achieve this rate. With contact and the 
application of force the joint torques increase to try 
and achieve the operator desired rate, however, the 
sum of the different joint torques rarely equates to a 
force in the desired direction. The force capability 
of the arm is highly dependent on arm 
configuration , arm rate limits and the geometry of 
the contact area. Furthermore, any trajectory 
deviations as a result of "sliding" due to contact 
also results in POHS issuing rate commands to 
maintain the desired trajectory. 
For the majority of ISS assembly operations the 
force capabilities of the arm meets the requirements 
of the various ISS elements and their interfaces. 
Successful installation of the ISS elements where 
the arm has been required to exert force has been 
achieved through thorough pre-mission planning 
and training to obtain precise alignment of the two 
elements being attached, prudent selection and use 
of arm rates and employing specific command 
techniques. 
Force capabilities are a particular concern when 
performing assembly operations where the force 
requirements are near the limit of the arm's 
capabilities. On STS-74 the assembly of the 
Russian docking module (DM) to the Orbiter 
Docking System (ODS) posed a unique set of 
challenges for the arm. The force requirements at 
the DM to ODS interface (known as the 
Androgynous Peripheral Docking System (APDS)) 
were found to be within the arm's capabilities when 
both elements were aligned very precisely. 
However, any misalignment between the two 
elements substantially increased the force required 
to mate the two. A technique was developed to 
position the DM above the ODS, limp the arm and 
then initiate the Orbiter' s thrusters for a 1 second 
pulse. The inertia of the DM and arm were used to 
effectively allow the Orbiter to dock to the DM 
with sufficient force to guarantee capture. This 
method was successfu II y used on STS-74 and also 
used twice on STS-88 to assemble the first two ISS 
elements. 
2.5.5 Development of PC Card 
To provide more operational data to the arm 
operator a PC card was developed to provide a data 
interface directly to the arm's Man ipulator 
Controller Interface Unit (MCIU). The MCrU 
controls the flow of data between the Display & 
control panel , the Orbiter's OPC and the arm itself. 
By providing a PC card interface to the MCIU a 
laptop can be used to display more real time 
operational data. 
2.5.6 Canadarm Add-ons 
The Canadarm has been modified numerous times 
to incorporate additional cameras in support of 
robotic operations. Side-view and RF cameras have 
been added to the wrist roll joint to provide 
additional camera views. Additionally, an EVA 
camera connector has been added to the end 
effector numerous times and used by spacewalking 
astronauts to provide camera views (including 
closeout photos) to the ground. 
A mounting bracket that was added as part of the 
end effector redesign has also been used to mount 
materials science and shuttle plume experiments. 
Also in support of materials science experiments 
the lower boom of the Canadarm has been fitted 
with a witness plate containing various materials to 
assess the effect of exposure to the environment of 
space. 
3 Improving Safety and Reducing Risk. 
While safety has always been of paramount 
importance in the design and build of hardware 
used in manned spaceflight programs, the 
Challenger accident in 1986 created re-emphasis on 
increasing safety and reducing risk. Following the 
accident, a concerted effort to re-assess all 
hardware to identify any possible areas of 
improvement in safety was undertaken. All 
Canadarm systems were re-visited and scrutinised 
using Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
to ensure that all precautions had been taken to 
reduce risk. 
The primary safety concern associated with the use 
of the RMS on-orbit is avoiding collisions between 
the arm or attached payloads and Orbiter structure 
or EVA crew. Under worst case conditions 
collisions could cause a Loss of Life or Vehicle 
which is the most critical safety issue. In normal 
operations, the RMS operator has the primary 
responsibility for collision avoidance between the 
arm, any payloads and Orbiter structure. 
The risk associated with collision avoidance is 
minimized through extensive pre-flight planning to 
ensure satisfactory clearance between Orbiter 
structure and the arm or attached payloads during 
arm operations. CoLlision avoidance during on-orbit 
operations is aided with the use of direct window 
and camera views and RMS operational data on the 
D&C Panel. 
With certain arm failure modes the risk of a 
potential collision is higher. Joint runaways, 
sluggish, frozen or free joints, un commanded 
release and uncommanded de-rigidization failures 
are, in the worst case, failure modes that are most 
associated with causing an unintended collision. 
Another important concern associated with on-orbit 
use of the arm is the inability to drive the arm. 
Under worst case conditions a loss of arm drive 
could cause a Loss of Mission which is a critical 
issue. Loss of arm drive is associated with worst 
case sluggish, free, or frozen joint, failure modes. 
Throughout the life of the Canadarm an extensive 
effort has gone into implementing hardware and 
software safety features to detect and handle any 
possible RMS failures. In addition, preventative 
On-Orbit procedures are used to help catch and 
avoid any conditions that could pose a potential 
safety concern. Furthermore, extensive generic and 
mission specific workaround procedures are 
developed to address any possible contingencies. 
After the intensive post -Challenger re-examination 
of Canadarm safety issues a number of new 
precautions were taken operationally, new software 
features were added and many of the critical failure 
modes were eliminated or mitigated by design in 
subsequent system upgrades. The following is a list 
of the most significant changes made to improve 
safety. 
3.1 Built-In Test Hardware 
The redesign of the arm's joint controllers (SPAs), 
to support space station assembly tasks, presented 
the opportunity to implement safety upgrades along 
side performance upgrades. The digital SPAs 
resulted in a safer system by eliminating all of the 
critical single point failure modes (21 Crit 1I\s) 
from the original analog design . This was 
accomplished through the introduction of extensive 
built-in test hardware to monitor critical functions 
of the SPA and to respond in a fail-safe manner 
when a failure condition is detected. 
Similarly, the redesign of the arm's manipulator 
controller interface unit (MCIU) has eliminated all 
8 single point critical failure modes. The MCIU is 
responsible for the transfer of critical command and 
status information between the operator's 
workstation, the shuttle's general purpose computer 
and the arm itself. As such, corruption of this data 
has potentially catastrophic results. Single point 
failure modes were eliminated through the 
implementation of redundancy and fail-safe circuit 
design. This included redundant processing of the 
operator's hand controller commands, continuous 
monitoring of communication buses and the 
replacement of active autosafing with fail-safe 
autobraking. 
3.2 Software Health Monitoring 
A brake slip check algorithm was added to the 
arm's control software to detect and annunciate a 
slip in the individual joints of 0.5 deg or a total slip 
in all six joints of 2.0 degrees while the brakes are 
on. 
With the introduction of POHS, the trajectory error 
relative to the operator desired command was 
computed within the control software. This error 
was used to provide an additional safety check to 
ensure that arm motion stayed within a safe 
boundary. This new software feature, referred to as 
Trajectory Tracking and Error Detection, ensures 
arm stays within 8 inches and 3 degrees of the 
operator desired trajectory. If the arm deviates from 
this envelope the brakes of the arm are 
automatically applied and an alarm is annunciated. 
A software feature to detect joint runaways at low 
rates was also implemented to reduce risk when 
operating the arm. The Vernier Consistency Check 
implemented in the control software compares the 
commanded joint rates to the actual joint rates and 
ensures that they are within a pre-defined tolerance. 
If the joint rate exceeds an acceptable level the 
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brakes of the arm are automatically applied and an 
alarm is annunciated. 
3.3 Operational Procedures and Flight Rules 
Generic and mission specific procedures and flights 
rules which govern how the operator is to use the 
arm on-orbit plays an important role in reducing 
risk . Based on systems capabilities and potential 
failure modes identified in the FMEA activity 
operations procedures and flight rules incorporate a 
number of operational constraints which ensures 
that arm performs its tasks in as safe a manner as 
possible. Arm procedures and flight rules address 
such issues as proximity operations, arm velocity, 
mode availability, available viewing and thermal 
constraints. Many of these procedures and rules 
have been adapted to incorporate knowledge of past 
and current system capabilities. 
4 Improving Ability to Meet the Flight 
Manifest - Supportability 
The Canadarm was designed for a service life 10 
years and 100 missions. Today, 20 years into its 
service life, NASA ' s fleet of arms has flown a total 
of just over 60 missions. With NASA planning to 
continue Shuttle flights until 2012 and possibly 
2020, a structured maintenance and refurbishment 
plan is required ensure continued success. 
Supportability focuses on combating obsolescence, 
ensuring spares availability and reducing repair 
cycle time in the event of hardware failures. 
Similar to NASA's scheduled Orbiter Maintenance 
Down Period (OMDP), a program of component 
inspection , refurbishment and replacement has been 
implemented for the Canadarm. Maintenance and 
upgrades are consolidated to avoid the costs of 
piecemeal refurbishment. Replacement electronic, 
electromechanical and active subs-assemblies are 
fit, form and functionally compatible with the 
components they replace. This ensures flexibility 
and eliminates costs and logistical difficulties 
associated with mixed-fleet operations. 
Logistics planning has established the level and 
quantities of spares dependant on predicted failure 
rates and estimated repair cycle times. For 
example, due to the mechanical complexity of the 
end effector and the potential for an extended repair 
cycle, five (5) complete end effectors were put into 
service supporting the fleet of four (4) arms. 
Components such as bakes, motors and 
commutators are assembled, into motor modules, 
tested and spared as a completed assemblies ready 
to be fitted to an arm if required. 
~~~~~~~~~- .. -.----~~-------
Hardware wear-and-tear, long-term effects of 
exposure to the thermal and vacuum environments 
of space and obsolescence and supportability risks 
are addressed through established inspection and 
maintenance requirements and prudent redesign and 
upgrade programs. 
Very little of the Can ad arm hardware has remained 
untouched. Within the last 10 years 90% of the 
arm-based electronics has been redesigned 
including the elimination of two electronic boxes 
by consolidating functionality within redesigned 
units. Gearboxes have been disassemb led, 
inspected and re-Iubricated. Structural 
components such as the carbon composite boom 
segments have been inspected via ultrasonic, x-ray 
and visual methods to verify continued flight 
worthiness. 
End effectors were upgraded in the early 1990's 
incorporating numerous changes to improve 
reliability and life. 
• Selected gears were surface hardened by 
nitriding 
• Mechanism damping and energy absorbing 
devices were added to lessen mechanism 
impact loads 
• Motor winding impregnation material was 
changed to improve heat dissipation 
• Brakes and clutch torque ratings were 
increased to increase life and provide 
redundancy. 
Redesigned brake units providing improved long 
term wear and friction performance characteristics 
are replacing the original brake units. 
Although outwardly today' s Canadarm is 
indistinguishable from the arm which first flew in 
1981 , it is a very different arm. A structured 
program of maintenance, inspection and 
replacement is ensuring continued success for the 
next 20 years of service. 
5 Potential Future Upgrades 
Based on operational trends and task requirements 
in previous missions, several potential upgrades to 
the Canadarm have been identified. These include: 
a) Incorporation of a Force Moment Sensor 
(FMS) at the end of the arm. The present 
SRMS design does not provide a means of 
determining tip force information for either the 
control system or operator display. In 
situations where the payload is misaligned with 
respect to the berthing guides, the operator 
must manually adjust the rate commands to 
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overcome the effect of contact forces in order 
to accomplish a berthing task. This becomes a 
more difficult task if the operator does not have 
sufficient information from visual cues to 
provide adequate situational awareness. Using 
the Force Moment Sensor data a Force 
Moment Accommodation (FMA) feature can 
be designed to automatically modify rate 
commands to alleviate forces and moments at 
the tip of the arm. This would nullify the effect 
of contact forces . This force control capability 
can be used to help align a payload within the 
interface alignment guides during the mating of 
space station components. FMA can therefore 
facilitate berthing tasks where the mating 
interface is obscured from operator view where 
visual alignment is difficult. An FMA/FMS 
design for the Special Purpose Dexterous 
Manipulator (SPDM) has been tested at MDR 
using the SPDM GT (Ground Testbed) with an 
operator-in-the-Ioop. The test results showed 
that FMA significantly eased the operator 
workload leading to a reduction in task 
timelines. 
FMA could also be help to counteract 
constrained forces thereby limiting the buildup 
of loads within the SRMS. An example where 
FMA would have been beneficial occurred on 
STS-88 during the retraction of the APDS 
interface to mate the Russian Functional 
Cargo Block (FGB) to the Node. The forces 
required to backdrive the electrically limp (full 
motor current attenuation) arms joints were 
high enough to cause a misalignment between 
the two elements. An FMA design could have 
employed active limping and ensured that the 
arm imparted no force during the retraction. 
b) Display and Control Panel. While most of the 
major components of the SRMS system have 
been upgraded or redesigned, the main 
operator interface to control the arm remains as 
it was originally built. The current display and 
control panel is limited to three digital displays 
and elector-mechanical barberpole, meters and 
switches. A new display and control panel 
could consolidate all arm command and 
display capabilities into one location. In 
addition to increased operational flexibility, 
improvements in safety could be realised 
through improved operator situational 
awareness and the el imination of the 16 single 
point failure modes that currently exist. 
c) Incorporation of Strain Gauges along arm. Life 
load estimates for the arm have based been on 
estimated launch and landing loads. To ensure 
that arm can continue to meet its launch 
manifest for another 20 years actual load 
cycles that arm undergoes during each launch 
and landing is required. Mounting strain 
gauges that are powered on during launch and 
landing would provide an accurate assessment 
of the stresses that the arm has undergone and 
provide a better estimate of remaining life. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
The Canadarm has been highly successful over its 
20 years of use aboard the Space Shuttle. Although 
the original design met all of the original design 
requirements continued success and improvements 
in safety (reduced risk) have been ensured through 
prudent upgrades to the system based on knowledge 
(lessons learned) of space environment and 
adapting to new operational requirements. On-
going and future adaptations to the arm will ensure 
the Canadarm is able to continue to meet its 
scheduled launch manifest until 2020. 
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